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Abstract
I report the results of a follow-up study, designed to address concerns raised by Kurthy and
Lawford-Smith in response to my original study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought)
and ability (can). Like the results of the original study, the results of the follow-up study do
not support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. The results of both studies suggest that OIC
is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I have argued in my paper, I take
this to mean that OIC can no longer be taken as axiomatic. It must be argued for without
appealing to intuitions.
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I would like to thank Miklos Kurthy and Holly Lawford-Smith for writing a
critical note in response to my paper about “Ought Implies Can” (i.e., if S ought to
A, then S can A; henceforth OIC). As I understand it, Kurthy and Lawford-Smith
have the following concerns about my experimental study:
1. Because ‘ought’ is ambiguous, and participants were not instructed to con-
sider a particular sense of ‘ought’, they may have had in mind a sense of
‘ought’ that does not imply ‘can’, even though there may be other senses of
‘ought’ that do imply ‘can’.
2. Because of the within-subjects experimental design, and having given a low
rating to the “can” question, participants might have thought that the ‘ought’
in the “ought” question is an optative ‘ought’ (as opposed to a moral, all-
things-considered ‘ought’, which is the sense of ‘ought’ Kurthy and Lawford-
Smith think does imply ‘can’).
Kurthy and Lawford-Smith helpfully suggest two ways to address their con-
cerns. First, they say that the sense of ‘ought’ needs to be specified as a moral,
all-things-considered ‘ought’, which is the sense of ‘ought’ Kurthy and Lawford-
Smith think does imply ‘can’. Second, they recommend asking participants about
the blameworthiness of the agents. So this is precisely what I did. That is, to ad-
dress their concerns, I have conducted a follow-up study with a between-subjects
experimental design. I have revised the “ought” question to make it clear that
the ‘ought’ in question is a moral, all-things-considered ‘ought’ and I have added a
question about the blameworthiness of the agent.
Before I report the results of this follow-up study, I would like to make a few
clarifications. First, Kurthy and Lawford-Smith claim that I take the results of my
experimental study as evidence that OIC is false. This, however, is a misinterpre-
tation of my argument. The results of my experimental study do not show—nor
do I take them to show—that OIC is false. Rather, the results show that OIC is
not intuitive. In other words, the hypothesis I set out to test in my experimental
study is not that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ but rather that OIC is intuitive, such that it
is taken as axiomatic by many philosophers. As I explicitly state in my paper:
If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philoso-
phers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents
who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to per-
form that action (p. 1; emphasis added).
The results of my experimental study, then, challenge the alleged intuitiveness of
OIC and suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition.
I take this to mean that OIC can no longer be taken as axiomatic. It must be argued
for without appealing to intuitions.
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Second, I think it is not quite accurate to say, as Kurthy and Lawford-Smith do,
that few, if any, philosophers “think that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ for every conceivable
reading of ‘ought’” (p. 3). (Wedgwood 2013, p. 70), for instance, claims that
“Every kind of ‘ought’ implies some kind of ‘can’.”
Third, Kurthy and Lawford-Smith think that the relation between ‘ought’ and
‘can’ is entailment. They write:
it was not clear to us why Mizrahi went with presupposition as the re-
lation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. [. . . ] Mizrahi dismisses entailment as
‘too strong’, without explanation. It’s true that there are innumerable
counterexamples to that reading if we don’t restrict the ‘ought’. But
we should restrict it (pp. 3-4).
As Kurthy and Lawford-Smith acknowledge, many philosophers think that the rea-
son the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is probably not entailment is that there
are numerous counterexamples to “Ought entails Can” (Howard-Snyder 2013).
Kurthy and Lawford-Smith rightly point out that entailment preserves contraposi-
tion. But it is precisely the contrapositive of “Ought entails Can” that opens OIC
to counterexamples. For example, if ‘ought’ entails ‘can’, and thus ‘cannot’ entails
‘not-ought’, then it is not case that members of hiring committees ought to evalu-
ate candidates without bias and prejudice, given that they cannot do so (see, e.g.,
Moss-Racusin et. al. 2012). If you think that members of hiring committees ought
to evaluate candidates without prejudice and bias, then you have a counterexample
to “Ought entails Can.” In support of entailment as the relation between ‘ought’
and ‘can’, Kurthy and Lawford-Smith say that “requiring persons to do what they
cannot really would be unfair, irrational, pointless” (p. 4; emphasis added). But this
is precisely what the presupposition interpretation of OIC says, not the entailment
interpretation. That is, if ‘ought’ entailed ‘can’, and S cannot A, then it would
necessarily follow that ‘S ought to A’ is false, not that it is unfair to say that S ought
to A, or that it is irrational to believe that S ought to A, or that it is pointless to tell
S that she ought to A. To say that it is unfair, irrational, or pointless to tell people
that they ought to do something that they cannot do is to say that ‘ought’ presup-
poses ‘can’, not that ‘ought’ entails ‘can’. If p entails q, and q is false, then p is false,
not merely unfair, irrational, or pointless. For this reason, Kurthy and Lawford-
Smith did not provide an argument as to why the relation between ‘ought’ and
‘can’ is entailment. Given that there are counterexamples against “Ought entails
Can,” it is generally accepted that entailment is probably not the relation between
‘ought’ and ‘can’; it is too strong a relation (Howard-Snyder (2013)). Now, let me
report the results of the follow-up study. For this follow-up study, 123 participants
(74 men, 49 women; ages 18-57) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participants were tested online using Qualtrics survey software, and compensated
$0.15 for approximately five minutes of their time. Since there was no significant
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difference in the original study between the vignettes in which the agent is the stu-
dent Nancy and the vignettes in which the agent is Professor Smith, I used only
one vignette in the follow-up study. All participants, then, received the following
vignette:
At the end of class, Sid approaches Professor Smith to ask a question.
Professor Smith tells Sid that he has to go teach another class now but
promises to meet with Sid during office hours later that day. As it turns
out, however, Professor Smith gets locked in his classroom before he
is able to make it to his office. After waiting for thirty minutes and
realizing that Professor Smith doesn’t show up, Sid leaves the office
without meeting Professor Smith.
After receiving this vignette, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
following three statements and were asked to indicate their level of agreement:
Taking into consideration all the facts about this case, Professor Smith
can keep his promise to meet with Sid.
Taking into consideration all the facts about this case, Professor Smith
ought to keep his promise to meet with Sid.
Taking into consideration all the facts about this case, Professor Smith
is to blame for failing to keep his promise to meet with Sid.
In accordance with Kurthy and Lawford-Smith’s suggestions, the phrase ‘taking
into consideration all the facts about this case’ is supposed to capture the sense of
the all-things-considered ‘ought’. In addition, the statements are now explicitly
about keeping a promise, which is undoubtedly a moral notion. Participants rated
these statements on a scale from 1 (= Strongly Disagree) to 5 (= Strongly Agree).
The means of the participants’ responses are displayed in Figure 1.
The data were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA. There was a significant effect
of question, F (1,22) = 21.56, p < .001. Tukey’s post-hoc tests showed lower
ratings for the “can” question (M = 2.03, SD = .96) than the “ought” question (M
= 3.64, SD = 1.07), p < .001, and the “blame” question (M = 2.6, SD = 1.16), p
= .037.
Accordingly, I did as Kurthy and Lawford-Smith have suggested, i.e., I prompted
participants to consider the sense of ‘ought’ that Kurthy and Lawford-Smith think
does imply ‘can’, namely, the all-things-considered, moral ‘ought’, and I added a
“blame” question in a between-subjects experimental design, and yet the results of
the follow-up study align with the results of the original study. As in the origi-
nal study, ratings for the “ought” question are significantly higher than those for
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Figure 1: Mean ratings of the “can,” “ought,” and “blame” questions.
the “can” question. Moreover, the higher ratings for the “blame” question com-
pared to the “can” question are not what we would expect if OIC were intuitive.
Indeed, the fact that the level of agreement for the “blame” question is consider-
ably lower than the one for the “ought” question, even though both of those are
still significantly higher than the level of agreement for the “can” question, suggests
that blameworthiness and moral obligation may not be as closely related as Kurthy
and Lawford-Smith suspect. This is just a suggestion, however, and further studies
are needed to test any (a)symmetries between ability, blameworthiness, and moral
obligation.
To sum up, the results of the original study and the follow-up study do not
support the hypothesis that OIC is intuitive. Instead, the results of both studies
suggest that OIC is probably not a principle of ordinary moral cognition. As I
have argued in my paper, I take this to mean that OIC can no longer be taken
as axiomatic. It must be argued for without appealing to intuitions. If there is
some sense of ‘ought’ that does imply ‘can’, as Kurthy and Lawford-Smith suspect,
then that sense of ‘ought’ must be specified and then shown (rather than simply
assumed) to be related to some sense of ‘can’ by entailment, presupposition, or
implicature.
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